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Abstract
Evidence suggests that subliminal stimuli can influence ostensibly volitional, executive processes but it is unclear whether
this is highly task-specific. To address this we used a set-switching task. Volunteers saw a word pair and reported either if
both words had the same number of syllables or if both were concrete. Task selection was random and instructed by a
hexagon/triangle preceding the words. A subliminally-presented square or diamond reliably preceded each of these
consciously perceived instruction-shapes. Significant congruency effects were observed in a subsequent Test Phase in
which primes no longer reliably predicted the task (and in which high/low tones now served as conscious instructions). The
Generalization Phase required novel phonological (rhyme) or semantic (category) judgments. Remarkably, unconscious
priming congruency effects carried over in those participants who had shown priming in the Test Phase, the degree
correlating across the two conditions. In a final phase of the study, participants were asked to discriminate between the two
originally presented prime shapes. Those participants whose discriminations were more accurate showed reduced priming
relative to participants with less accurate discriminations. The results suggest that, rather than being highly task specific,
priming can operate at the level of a generalizable process and that greater awareness of primes may lessen their impact on
behavior.
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Introduction
Events that occur outside awareness can nevertheless influence
perceptual, semantic and motor functions. Words or pictures
presented at durations too brief to allow identification can, for
example, speed identification of a subsequent related word or
image. There is an extensive literature on such perceptual,
semantic and motor priming effects [1,2,3]. Only recently have
studies begun to investigate whether ostensibly volitional executive
processes can also be primed. Lau and Passingham ([4] see also
Mattler [5]) asked healthy volunteers to switch between two sorts
of tasks (‘‘mental sets’’). Such task-switching is invariably
associated with a time-cost compared with the consistent
application of a single-task, even when the switch can be
anticipated [6]. In Lau and Passingham’s paradigm participants
were presented with a word and asked either to judge whether it
had two syllables or whether it was concrete. The random
ordering of trials meant that participants could not anticipate the
relevant rule until an instruction (a diamond or square) appeared
just before the word. However, for an extremely brief period (33
msec.) prior to this conscious instruction, a subliminal diamond or
square prime appeared. Although unable to see or identify it,
responses were significantly faster following a congruent prime-
instruction pair than an incongruent pair. Furthermore, functional
magnetic resonance imaging suggested that, on incongruent trials,
brain regions associated with the primed but irrelevant task (e.g.
areas linked to phonological analysis during a concrete judgment
trial) were more active in comparison with a congruent condition.
Acknowledging the difficulty in assessing the absolute visibility of
an ‘unconscious’ stimuli, Lau and Passingham included a third
condition in which the prime was rendered more visible and,
remarkably, reported a dissociation in which the more visible
prime had no detectable effect on switching performance.
Weibel et al. [7] sought to address concerns that the visibility of
the unconscious primes in Lau and Passingham’s study may have
been influenced by the presence of these identical visible primes.
Accordingly they administered a phonological/semantic word
judgment set-switching paradigm in which participants were never
consciously exposed to primes. In the design a consciously
perceived letter indicating the task to perform was presented 156
msec. before the word. Prior to this (36 msec. Experiment 1, 84
msec. Experiment 2) the same letter had been presented for a very
brief (12 msec.) period followed by a mask. A condition was also
included in which the task was only to discriminate the conscious
instruction in order to examine whether the apparent priming of
task-set may in fact be perceptual priming of the instruction. At
short SOAs the primes indeed sped recognition of the subsequent
(if identical) conscious instruction letter but did not produce
facilitation/interference with reaction time on the word judgment
task. In contrast, at the longer SOA (i.e. closer to that used by Lau
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and Passingham) perceptual priming of the instruction letter and
ostensible task-set priming occurred.
This result highlights a difficulty in fully interpreting the
pioneering behavioral work of Mattler [5] and Lau and
Passingham [4]; whether, due to the use of identical stimuli for
prime and conscious instructions, the effects reflect speeding
identification of the conscious instruction (i.e. perceptual priming)
or unconscious priming of task set. Seeking to address this issue,
Reuss et al. [8] employed a switching paradigm in which, on key
trials, there was no conscious instruction. In the task participants
had either to judge the magnitude of a digit (.,5) or its odd/even
status. Half of the trials by alternation had a clearly visible
instruction, one of two letters arbitrarily linked with the tasks. In
the other trials the same letter primes were rendered invisible or
less visible by brevity (30 msec.) and masking. Participants were
asked to look out for instruction letters and, if one was seen,
perform the indicated task. If no instruction was seen, they should
choose which of the two tasks to perform, selecting each with
approximately equal frequency. In trials with a visible instruction,
participants were accurate (93%) and showed the expected switch-
cost in reaction times and accuracy when the current trial required
a different task to that previously chosen. Despite the apparent
free-choice on masked instruction trials, these deviated moderately
but significantly from chance in the direction of the hidden
instruction (53.9% congruent). Although an issue in this study was
that discrimination of the hidden instruction on post-test was also
above chance (53.3%), the magnitude of priming effect was not
correlated with detection rates. As the authors point out, the
possibility of apparent task-set priming resulting from perceptual
priming of a subsequent consciously perceived instruction is ruled
out by the absence of a seen instruction in the ‘free choice’ trials.
Notably, however, in this paradigm as with that of Lau and
Passingham[4], the unconscious prime was identical to the
instruction consciously linked with each task.
Zhou and Davis [9] circumvented problems related to
perceptual priming of instructions and the possibility that the
unconscious prime might trigger the learned association between a
consciously perceived instruction and task-set. They (Experiments
2A and 2B) adapted Lau and Passingham’s switching paradigm
and introduced a learning phase in which two subliminal shapes
reliably preceded each of two (different) consciously perceived
instruction-shapes but were never themselves made conscious.
Participants were not told about the primes nor were they able to
identify them on post-test when they now knew which shapes to
look for and were attending to their occurrence. Nevertheless, in a
test phase where prime-task pairings were random, there was a
significant congruency effect based on the training phase. The
possibility of this resulting from perceptual priming of the
conscious instruction was abolished both by the prime and
instruction shapes differing during learning, and the conscious
instruction changing from shapes to tones in the test phase. An
interesting additional finding from Zhou and Davis’ studies was
that deliberately directing participants’ attention away from the
location of the unconscious prime did not erode the priming task-
set congruency effect, indeed, in some experiments this appeared
to strengthen it.
In summary, whilst there is some skepticism about unconscious
priming of task set and whether effects may be more parsimoni-
ously related to prime visibility or perceptual priming etc., careful
analyses in different laboratories in recent years have increased
confidence that such influences can be detected. An issue is that
level at which such priming may operate; whether, for example, it
is highly specific to the particular tasks/stimulus set etc. used or
could generalize to a novel task that required related cognitive
processes. To address this issue we adapted Zhou and Davis’ [9]
paradigm. In each trial of our Training Phase two words were
simultaneously presented on the screen and participants were
asked to judge either whether they had the same number of
syllables or whether both represented concrete concepts. This was
disambiguated by one of two consciously perceived instruction
shapes (hexagon/triangle) that preceded the words. Earlier in each
trial one of two subliminal prime shapes (square/diamond) was
presented, each reliably paired over the block with one of the
subsequent instruction shapes. In the Test Phase, during which
each prime preceded the syllable and concrete task with equal
frequency, we examined whether congruency effects related to the
Training Phase were detectable. The use of word pairs allowed us
to develop a further Generalization Phase. Here, word-pairs were
again presented but now participants were asked to judge either
whether they rhymed or whether they were from the same
common semantic category (e.g. both fruits, furniture etc.). If
congruency effects persisted it would suggest primes were
operating at a more general level of process, biasing participants
towards phonological analysis rather than just syllable enumera-




The study was given ethical approval by the Cambridge
Psychology Research Ethics Committee (ref: TM99). Thirty-three
participants (all over 18 years old, mean age 26.88, SD 9.10, 22
women) were recruited from the Medical Research Council
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panel and gave
informed written consent for their participation. Participants were
all native English speakers with no history of neurological disorder
and with normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing.
Experimental task
Training Phase. Trials in the Training Phase (see figure 1)
began with a black central fixation cross presented against a
uniform white background of a 3006400 mm cathode ray tube
computer monitor (refresh rate 120 Hz). After 300 msec., a black
prime (square or diamond 16616 mm) appeared for 8.3 msec. to
the left or right side of the fixation cross (which remained on-
screen). Both prime and cross then disappeared for 16.6 msec.,
after which two visual masks, formed by the superimposed outlines
of the square and diamond, were presented simultaneously in both
possible prime locations for 49.8 msec. The duration and masking
were designed to render the primes subliminal. Following another
blank screen for 99.6 msec., a central black hexagon or triangle
(16616 mm) was then presented for 49.8 msec., followed by a
blank screen for 99.6 msec. This unmasked shape was the
consciously perceived instruction cue indicating which of the two
tasks participants were to perform on the subsequently presented
word pair (hexagon-syllables, triangle-concrete). Words were
presented 7.5 cm apart in the center of the screen in black capital
letters (4 mm in height). The words remained on the screen until
the participant’s response was registered. The same, labeled
response keys were used for both tasks (QWERTY N = same,
M = different).
Training Phase pairings were always square subliminal prime
followed by conscious triangle instruction indicating concrete/
abstract judgment or diamond subliminal prime followed by
conscious hexagon instruction indicating syllable number judg-
ment. The 96 training trials were cross-balanced in terms of task
and correct same/different response. Trials in each task were
Generalization of Unconscious Priming
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mixed in terms of whether the response would be congruent in the
other task (e.g. concrete-concrete pairs could have the same or
different number of syllables).
Test Phase. The 64 trials in the Test Phase were identical to
those of the Training Phase with the following exceptions. The
prime-task pairings were now 50% congruent with those of the
Training Phase and 50% incongruent. To abolish any purely
perceptual priming, as with Zhou and Davis [9], the conscious
instruction for the concrete task was now a high (437.32 Hz) tone
of 400 msec. duration and the instruction for the syllables task was
now a low tone (210.68 Hz, 400 msec.). As with the Training
Phase, the proportions of concrete/syllable trials and same/
different trials were cross-balanced.
Generalization Phase. The 64 trials of the Generalization
Phase were identical to those of the Test Phase with one exception.
The low tone instructed participants to judge whether the words
rhymed (‘‘same’’) or not (‘‘different’’). A high tone instructed them
to report whether or both words were from the same semantic
category. The categories (furniture, animals, clothing, fruits,
emotions and concepts relating to justice) were selected so as to
include concrete and abstract words. Participants were told the
categories in the Generalization Phase instructions.
Prime identification test. Finally participants were shown
pictures of the diamond and square primes and then asked to
complete a 64-item forced-choice diamond/square identification
task in which the primes were presented in random order.
Presentation was as in the previous phases but with no subsequent
conscious instruction or word pair.
Generation of word-pair stimuli
A word list was generated using the MRC Psycholinguistic
database (http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.
htm), with the search criteria being: 4-12 letters, 1-3 syllables,
Brown verbal frequency rating of 1-5000. Archaic and abbreviated
words were excluded. For the syllable judgment trials, 160 words
were selected from the one, two or three syllables lists and then
randomly paired such that half matched in this respect. Words
with relatively high and low concreteness values (.550 or ,350)
were used for the syllable and concrete task pairs.
For the rhyming task the first word was also selected where
possible from the high and low concreteness list. Rhymes in which
both phonology and orthography matched (SORROW BOR-
ROW) and where only phonology matched (PLAYS RAISE) were
used. The constraints of generating rhyming word pairs meant it
was no longer possible to balance the presentation of items
between the two task types of the previous blocks; relatively few
words relating to the semantic categories appeared in the rhyme
task pairs and there were no trials in which both semantic category
words rhymed. Whilst this would arguably reduce response
conflict, the key question here concerned prime-task congruency.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were tested
individually in a quiet slightly darkened room. They sat at a
comfortable viewing distance from the monitor. Participants were
given initial instructions about the overt structure of each trial, the
two tasks and examples of concrete and abstract words.
Participants were not told about the primes at this stage. They
then completed the Training Phase. Before the Test Phase,
participants were told about and played examples of the tones that
now served as instructions. Before the Generalization Phase the
participants were instructed to now perform the rhyme/semantic
tasks. No explicit link was made in the instructions between the
concrete and semantic judgments or the syllable and rhyme
judgments. After the Generalization Phase participants were asked
whether or not they had noticed anything else in the trials. They




No participant reported having noticed the primes or masks in
the trials. Performance in identifying the shapes in the prime
identification test at a group level was at chance (mean accuracy
on forced choice task = 50.05%, SD 6.32, range 35.93–59.38,
single sample comparison to 50, t(32) = 0.04, p = 0.966).
Test and Generalization Phase accuracy
Overall, participants were very accurate in their judgments,
making errors on a mean of just 0.73% (SD 0.53, range 0–2.19%)
of trials in the Test Phase and on 0.55% of trials (SD 0.54 range 0–
2.5%) in the Generalization Phase. Direct comparisons between
error rates in the four tasks (Test Phase: concrete judgment and
syllable judgment, Generalization Phase: semantic and rhyme
judgment) revealed a significant overall effect of task
(F(3,96) = 6.01, p = 0.001). Post-hoc analysis using Least Signifi-
cant Difference (LSD) showed that errors were significantly less
common on the rhyme judgment task (0.36% of trials, SD 0.46)
than on all other tasks (semantic categories 0.75% SD 0.70,
concrete 0.79% SD 0.61, syllable 0.67% SD 0.68; p,0.01). No
other difference was statistically significant.
Figure 1. Sequence of events in each trial of the Training, Test
and Generalization Phases. A central fixation cross was presented
for 300 msec. followed by a diamond or square prime to the left or right
of fixation for 8.3 msec. Following a blank screen of 16.6 msec duration
two masks were presented in both of the potential prime locations and
remained on screen for 49.8 msec followed by a blank screen of 99.6
msec. The conscious instruction was then presesented. In the Training
Phase this consisted of a central black triangle or hexagon for 49.8
msec. In the Test and Generalization Phases this was replaced by a high
or low tone of 400 msec. duration. Following a further blank screen of
99.6 msec., the word pair was presented which remained on screen
until a response was made.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088416.g001
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There was no statistically significant difference in error rates
between trials requiring a different task to the previous trial (switch
trials) and trials that were a continuation of the same task (non-
switch trials) in the Test or Generalization Phases (Test Phase
error rate on switch trials 0.65% SD 0.65, non-switch trials 0.82%
SD 0.59; F(1,32) = 2.56, p= 0.12); Generalization Phase error rate
on switch trials 0.54% SD 0.57; errors on non-switch trials 0.57%
SD 0.60; F(1,32) = 0.11, p = 0.74). There was also no significant
interaction between switch vs. non-switch trials and task type
(semantic vs. phonological) in either the Test or Generalization
Phases (Repeated measures ANOVA with dependent variable of
percentage error and the factors of switching vs. non-switching
trial type and semantic vs. phonological task for the Test Phase;
switch vs. non-switch; F(1,32) = 2.52, p = 0.12, switch x task
F(1,32) = 0.01, P= 0.91; for the Generalization Phase switch vs.
non-switch F(1,32) = 0.156, p = 0.69, switch x task F(1,32) = 0.79,
p = 0.38).
In summary, errors occurred at a low rate (,1%) across all
relevant phases and trial types, the lowest being for the rhyme task.
This indicates that participants understood and could do the tasks
and increases the confidence we can attach to inferences drawn
from the reaction time (RT) data.
Unconscious prime – conscious instruction congruency
effect: Test Phase
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with the depen-
dent variable of Test Phase correct RT and the factors of Task
type (concrete vs. syllable counting), Trial Switch Status (switch vs.
non-switch trial) and Congruency (prime-instruction congruent vs.
incongruent). This revealed no main effect of Task type
(F(1,32) = 0.50, p = 0.48); RTs were not significantly longer for
concrete (mean 2777 msec. SD 849) than syllable judgment trials
(2827 msec. SD 851). The main effect of Switch Status was
significant with, as would be expected, RTs being significantly
longer on switch compared with non-switch trials (switch trial
RT=2935 msec. SD 856; non-switch trials 2655 msec. SD 743;
F(1,32) = 12.54, p = 0.001). There was no main effect of prime-task
Congruency (F(1,32) = 0.13, p = 0.73) but there was a statistically
significant interaction between Switch Status and Congruency
(F(1,32) = 8.93, p = 0.005, effect size, partial eta squared 0.22,Co-
hen’s d 1.06, a ‘large effect’); on switch trials RTs were
significantly faster when preceded by a congruent unconscious
prime (2834 msec. SD 827) than an incongruent unconscious
prime (mean 3062 msec. SD 1023; F(1,32) = 5.75, P= 0.023, see
figure 2). On non-switch trials there was no statistically significant
difference between congruent (2741 msec. SD 905) and incon-
gruent primes (2563 msec. SD 690; F(1,32 = 3.29, P= 0.08) in fact
a trend in the other direction. No other interactions were
statistically significant.
In summary, participants demonstrated the expected switch
trial RT cost and it was on switch trials that the predicted
significant prime congruency effect was observed. Notably,
although statistically significant overall, for 10/33 participants
congruent switch trial mean RTs were very close to and sometimes
even slower than incongruent trial RTs, perhaps reflecting
individual differences in susceptibility to the priming effect.
Generalization of the prime-instruction congruency
effect
To examine whether the congruency effect in switching
between the semantic and phonological tasks of the Test Phase
would generalize, the same analyses outlined above were carried
out on data from the Generalization Phase. Initially, we performed
a repeated measures ANOVA on the dependent variable of
correct RT with the factors of task (phonological vs. semantic),
switch status (switch trials vs. non-switch trials) and prime-task
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). This revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of task (F(1,32) = 82.32, P,0.001), correct
responses on the semantic task were slower (2117 msec. SD 755)
than on the phonological task (1631 msec. SD 648). There was
also the expected significant effect of switch status with switch trials
having significantly longer RTs (1986 msec. SD 816) than non-
switch trials (1761 msec. SD 646; F(1,32) = 16.16, P,0.001).
There was no overall effect of prime-task congruency
(F(1,32) = 0.20, P = 0.661) and no statistically significant interac-
tions (task x switch F(1,32) 1.04, P= 0.32; task x congruency
F(1,32) = 0.08, P = 0.77; switch x congruency F(1,32) = 1.04,
P= 0.32; task x switch x congruency (1,32) = 0.94, P= 0.34). We
then compared correct RTs from only the switch trials (a mean of
34.70/64 trials were switch trials). The same general pattern was
apparent as for the Test Phase; prime-instruction congruent trials
showed a trend towards significant speeding (1962 msec. SD 683)
relative to incongruent switch trials (2097 msec. SD 737;
F(1,32) = 3.76, P= 0.061 two tailed).
However, there were good reasons to predict, a priori, that
participants who had demonstrated no clear prime congruency
effect during the Test Phase would be unlikely to develop it in the
Generalization Phase (i.e. on a different task, and when a period –
the Test Phase – had elapsed during which primes had no
predictive value for task). Accordingly, to reduce the risk of a type
II error, we examined whether priming generalized using data
from those participants who were at or above the 50th percentile
with respect to a congruency effect during the Test Phase switch
trials. The mean congruency effect in the Test Phase (i.e. mean
correct RT on incongruent switch trials – mean correct RT on
congruent switch trials) for this group was 551 msec. (SD 318,
range 168-1209) compared with -154 msec. (SD 265, range -629-
155) in the remainder of the participant group.
A repeated measures ANOVA on these 16 participants’ data
from the Generalization Phase was then performed with the
dependent variable of correct RT and the factors of task
(phonological vs. semantic), trial switch status (switch vs. non-
switch) and prime-task congruency (congruent vs. incongruent).
Figure 2. Mean correct reaction times (msec. +/2 standard
error) by prime-task congruency in the Test and Generalization
Phases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088416.g002
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This revealed that, unlike the Test Phase and as highlighted in the
main Generalization Phase ANOVA above, there was a statisti-
cally significant effect of task (F(1,15) = 37.52, p,0.001) with
rhyme judgments having faster RTs (1630 msec. SD 567) than
semantic judgment trials (2101 msec. SD 624). There was a
significant main effect of trial switch status (F(1,15) = 11.0,
P = 0.005) with switch trials having longer RTs (1964 msec. SD
645) than non-switch trials (1768 msec. SD 623). There was no
overall effect of congruency (F(1,15) = 0.62, p= 0.44) and no
interaction between task and congruency (F(1,15) = 0.20, p = 0.67).
There was, however, a statistically significant interaction between
trial switch status and congruency (F(1,15) = 5.26, p= 0.037, effect
size partial eta squared 0.26,Cohen’s d 1.19, a ‘large effect’);
Congruent switch trials had a mean RT of 1887 msec. (SD 441),
incongruent 2189 msec. (SD 670; F(1,15) = 9.67, p = 0.007).
Congruent non-switch trials mean 1712 msec. (SD 520), incon-
gruent 1671 msec. (SD 492; F(1,15= 0.28, P= 0.60 – see figure 2).
Next, to explore whether between-subject differences in the size
of the congruency effect were likely to be reliable, we examined the
correlation between these effects in the Test and Generalization
Phases. Simple comparison of differences in RT between the
congruent and incongruent condition is likely to exaggerate any
relationship as people with generally longer RTs will tend to show
larger absolute differences in RTs between different conditions.
Differences in RT between congruent and incongruent switch
trials for each phase were therefore expressed as a proportionate
change from the mean congruent RT for that phase (scaled
difference = (RTI – RTC)/RTC, where I = incongruent switch
trials and C = congruent switch trials). The magnitude of these
differences in the Test and Generalization Phase were significantly
correlated (Pearson’s r (33) = 0.35, P,0.046). Next we sought to
clarify whether the priming effect in the Generalization Phase was
statistically weaker than in the Test Phase. To this end we
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on the dependent
variable of correct RT with the factors of Phase (Test vs.
Generalization), Task (semantic vs. phonological) Switch-status
(switch vs. non-switch) and Congruency (congruent vs. incongru-
ent primes). This revealed a statistically significant effect of Phase
(F(1,32) = 98.41, P,0.001), reaction times were generally longer in
the Test Phase (2800 msec. SD 1020) than in the Generalization
Phase (1874 msec. SD 743), and of Task (F(1,32) 19.23, P,0.001),
responses were faster overall in the phonological (2192 msec. SD
982) than the semantic (2482 msec. SD 1009) tasks. As would be
expected, overall RTs on switch trials were significantly longer
than on non-switch trials (F(1,32) = 23.03, P,0.001; switch 2467
msec. SD 1056, non-switch 2207 msec. SD 935). As would also be
expected from the previous results, the effect of cue congruency
taken across switch and non-switch trials was not statistically
significant (F(1,32) = 0.22, P = 0.65). There was the expected Phase
x Task interaction (F(1,32) = 6.82, P= 0.014), the differences
between RT to the different phonological and semantic tasks
differing between phases (see above for RT differences in the
tasks). There were no interactions between Phase and Switch
(F(1,32) = 0.61, P= 0.44), Task and Switch (F(1,32) = 0.50,
P = 0.49), Phase, Task and Switch (F(1,32) = 0.0, P= 0.97), Phase
and Congruence (F(1,32) = 0.001, P = 0.97), Task and Congruence
(F(1,32) = 0.11, P= 0.75), or Phase, Task and Congruence
(F(1,32) = 0.002, P= 0.97). There was however a significant Switch
x Congruence interaction (F(1,32) = 7.43, P = 0.01) reflecting the
greater effect of prime congruence on switch trials. There was
however no statistically significant Phase x Switch x Congruence
interaction (F(1,32) = 2.91, P= 0.098), the modulatory effects of
switch vs. non-switch on congruence effects did not formally differ
between the Test and Generalization Phases. There were no
statistically significant interactions between Task, Switch and
Congruence (F(1,32) = 0.05, P= 0.83) or between Phase, Task,
Switch and Congruence (F(1,32) = 0.75, P= 0.39). Differences in
the magnitude of priming in the Test and Generalization Phases
were also examined using the RT-controlled priming effects (see
above). On repeated measures ANOVA with the factor of task
phase (Test vs. Generalization) the difference was not statistically
significant across all 33 participants (F(1,32) = 0.0, P= 0.995) or
when just the 16 who showed the greatest priming effects in the
Test Phase were considered (F(1,15) = 1.13, P= 0.30), although
power to detect a significant difference is of course an issue. The
respective effect sizes of the priming effects in the Test and
Generalization Phases were however of similar magnitude (Test
1.06, Generalization 1.19).
Influence of prime discrimination
As discussed, at the end of the session participants were tested
on their ability to discriminate the (now known) primes under the
same brief, masked conditions as the earlier phases of the
experiment. Whilst, on average, performance was at chance levels
(see above) there was some variability. Previous research (e.g.
[4,7,9]) suggests that the effect of cues in such task switching
studies may, paradoxically, be greater when the primes are
rendered less rather than more visible. To examine this issue, we
first examined Pearson’s correlations between individual priming
effects (correct RT on incongruent trials – correct RT on
congruent trials) and percentage accuracy on the prime-discrim-
ination task. Although there was a consistency to the pattern in
which the participants with the highest prime-discrimination
scores tended to have the lower priming effects, neither test
reached statistical significance (Test Phase priming effect-prime
discrimination performance Pearson’s r (33) 20.25, P = 0.17;
Generalization Phase priming effect-prime discrimination r (33)
20.20, P= 0.26). Note: It was not necessary to use the RT-
normalised priming effect scores described in the previous section
because the current analyses did not directly contrast Test and
Generalization Phases, simply the relationships between the
priming effects within each and prime-discrimination perfor-
mance. However, analyses using normalized scores returned
almost identical results to the raw scores (Test Phase normalized
priming effect-prime discrimination r(33) =20.27, P = 0.13; Gen-
eralization Phase normalized priming effect-prime discrimination
r(33) 20.26, P= 0.15).
We then examined the extremes of the prime-discrimination
continuum in a one-way ANOVA with the dependent variable of
priming effect in the Test Phase (correct incongruent RT – correct
congruent RT) and the factor of prime-discrimination (upper
quartile vs. lower quartile). This showed that those participants
scoring highest in prime-discrimination indeed had significantly
lower priming effects (-124 msec. SD 401) than those with
relatively low discrimination scores (308 msec. SD 374;
F(1,14) = 4.95, P= 0.04 – see figure 3) despite these groups not
differing in their overall RT on the Test Phase (F(1,14) = 0.042,
P= 0.841). The high/low prime-discrimination effect on Gener-
alization Phase priming effect scores was in the same direction but
not statistically significant (participants with relatively high prime-
discrimination scores priming effect = 52 msec.; SD 353; partic-
ipants with relatively low scores 195 msec.; SD 424; F(1,14) = 0.54,
P= 0.48). Participants in the upper quartile on the prime-
discrimination test correctly reported the identity of the prime
on 58.07% of trials (SD 1.30, range 56.25–59.38), those in the
lower quartile had a mean accurate detection rate of 41.80% (SD
2.74, range 35.94–43.75).
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In summary, the consistent pairing of the different primes with
the phonological task of judging syllable number and the semantic
task of concrete judgments in the Learning Phase exerted a
significant influence over correct RTs in a subsequent Test Phase,
sufficiently strongly in some participants to support a group effect
despite approximately a third of participants showing little or no
effect. This occurred despite the participants being unable to
identify the primes even when subsequently attending to their
occurrence. Interestingly, and in line with previous reports,
participants who were most able to discriminate the primes at
post-test showed significantly lower priming effects during the Test
Phase than those least able to discriminate the primes. Participants
who showed priming in the Test Phase showed a significant carry-
over to the new tasks of the Generalization Phase, with
susceptibility to the effect correlating in the two conditions.
Discussion
Previous reports suggest that subliminal primes can activate
‘task sets’, mental programs that specify stimulus-response rules
required to perform a specific task ([4,7,8,9]). However, in all but
one previous report [9], the participants had made conscious links
between the symbol used as the prime and the relevant task set (i.e.
the primes were identical to the subsequent consciously perceived
instruction). It is possible, therefore, that the primes did little more
than activate a perceptual ‘template’ that is consciously, deliber-
ately associated with a task – rather like the ‘action triggers’
postulated by Kunde and colleagues [10].
Circumventing this limitation, Zhou and Davis [9] established
prime-task associations without participants ever being consciously
aware of the primes and showed that significant congruency effects
nevertheless occurred. Using identical training/test phases, albeit
with a modified task and different equipment, we have replicated
this extraordinary finding here; it appears possible to subliminally
prime ostensibly volitional changes in task-set.
The key finding from the current study concerns the level at
which such priming can occur. We have shown, for the first time,
that priming by cues that lie outside of conscious awareness can
extend beyond the specific trained task to novel tasks that require
related processes. That primes linked with a syllabic enumeration
task influenced subsequent rhyme judgments strongly suggests that
a switch to more general process of phonological analysis (as well
as, potentially, activity specific to syllable counting) was being
facilitated. Similarly, that a subliminal cue linked with judging
concreteness influenced subsequent judgments of whether ‘‘de-
fense’’ and ‘‘guilty’’ were related strongly indicates that a switch to
a ‘semantic mode’ (in addition to activity specific to concrete/
abstract distinctions) was primed.
Although formal testing detected no statistically significant
difference in priming magnitude between Test and Generaliza-
tion, and the effect sizes were of a similar magnitude, there are
reasons to believe that the effects could tend to be weaker. In
addition to having different tasks, the Generalization phase was
separated from the Training phase by a long interval (the Test
Phase) in which primes no longer reliably predicted task. An
interesting manipulation for future studies would be to repeat the
100% prime-task predictive Training phase before switching to the
generalization tasks to estimate the specific effects of task-change
on priming.
Some previous studies [4,9] have reported unconscious priming-
congruency effects based on all trials in the task and not delineated
effects for switch and non-switch trials. As here, Reuss et al. (study
2) reported effects of masked primes only on switch trials (in their
case only on accuracy)[8]. In our study, non-switch trials in the
Test phase showed a trend for faster responses following
incongruent primes, a potentially interesting effect for which we
have no explanation. However, that this was absent in the
Generalization phase suggests that it may not be reliable. There
are grounds to expect that switch and non-switch trials may differ.
Faster RTs on non-switch trials indicate that the correct task set
was already in place from the previous trial(s). An unconscious
prime that is congruent with both the preceding trial and the
subsequent conscious instruction for the next trial (i.e. on a non-
switch trial) may have little detectable additional impact in
facilitating maintenance of the appropriate task set. On switch
trials, by definition, there can be no such useful carry-over of task,
hence the influence of the primes may be more easily detected.
Further work is required to establish the reliability of this switch/
non-switch trial difference.
Our results suggest that individual differences in how strongly
the congruency effect appeared in the Test Phase were broadly
reflected in the Generalization phase. It would be surprising if this
were not the case. We cannot infer from this correlation that there
are individual differences in susceptibility to unconscious task-set
priming that are reliable across tasks as we had only one training
phase in the study.
About a third of the participants showed little evidence of
congruency effects in the Test phase, with the remainder showing
it sufficiently strongly to return the overall group result. Various
factors have been linked to priming susceptibility including
perceptual and inhibitory differences but it is unclear how much
these generalize over tasks and contexts [11,12]. Two previous
reports [4,9]have suggested that priming in similar task-switching
paradigms may be weakened when the primes are made more
visible. Whilst we did not manipulate visibility the finding of
significantly lower priming effects in participants in the top
quartile on the prime-discrimination test (in the absence of any
general RT differences) was consistent with this suggestion. It has
been argued in other priming contexts that masked unconscious
primes are not processed as separate perceptual events but
contribute to the overall accumulation of evidence leading to a
response [13,14]. In the Test (and Generalization) phases in the
current study, the primes are not useful to task performance
Figure 3. Priming effect in the Test Phase (correct RT in on
prime-task incongruent trials - correct RT on prime-task
congruent trials (msec. +/2 standard error) for participants in
the upper and lower quartile of post-test prime discrimination
performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088416.g003
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because they are as likely to be incongruent with the subsequent
instruction as congruent. The result would therefore be consistent
with greater awareness of the prime as a separate perceptual event
allowing participants to discount their influence in a way that is
less possible for participants who, by inference from the prime-
discrimination test, are less aware of their occurrence; paradox-
ically it may be harder to ‘ignore’ something of which you are not
consciously aware.
The idea that events that lie outside of conscious awareness may
influence cognitive function and behavior is already well
established. It would be surprising in many ways if they did not.
Some contemporary accounts view the brain as trying to build
optimal statistical models of events from imperfect data to guide
action (e.g. [15]). It would make little sense for entry to those
models was limited to the subset of information to which we have
conscious access. In the tasks used in this study, as almost
invariably occurs across any range of measures, participants
become progressively faster in making their responses. This can be
related to repeated experience of making the kind of decisions
required but also growing familiarity with the task structure and
the repetition of intervals, locations etc. within trials. These can
guide the orchestration of attention and mental content to
contribute to progressively faster responses without participants
necessarily being conscious of this process. We have demonstrated
that subliminal priming of task-switching can generalize to a new
task, but here the novel task was embedded in an identical trial
structure to that in which the priming was first acquired. An
interesting question for the likely ecological significance of the
effect is whether such generalization is robust to temporal and
spatial variations or is limited the invariant structure of our trials.
In summary the results of this study were consistent with
previous reports in showing that reliable predictive relationships
between two brief, masked visual primes and two task-sets during a
Training phase resulted in significant prime-task congruency RT
effects in a subsequent Test phase, despite participants being, on
average, entirely unable to discriminate the prime shapes on post-
test. The current study extended previous findings in showing that
the prime influence generalized to a novel task, consistent with
priming occurring at the level of process as well as, or rather than,
the highly specific task. Although the current study did not
manipulate prime visibility, interestingly, individual differences in
participants’ ability to discriminate the primes at post-test was, at
the extremes of the continuum, related to individual variability in
the magnitude of priming during the Test phase.
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